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Introduction
Information has become a common and valuable com-
modity, with increased attention being focused on how
information is handled, stored, and distributed.1 The
role of universities as generators of knowledge
underscores the importance of information manage-
ment through the data life cycle from generation, proc-
essing, analysis, access, and reuse. Comprehensive
information and communication technology (ICT)
frameworks exist, such as COBIT 5 and ISO27001, and
are aligned to King IV TM for ICT governance, Prince2
for project management, and the NIST security frame-
work.2 Universities in general and particularly in South
Africa, adopt these at different levels. A researcher or ac-
ademic is one of the stakeholders in a university that
Key Points
 In South Africa, a similar regulation strategy to
the European Union General Data Protection
Regulation, called the Protection of Personal
Information Act (No 4 of 2013) (POPIA), will be
implemented, with a view to mitigate cybercrime
and information security vulnerabilities.
 A qualitative exploratory analysis of information
security management at universities in South
Africa, using a Technology, Organisation, and
Environment model, highlights the need for
maintaining the security infrastructure to facili-
tate management of security within the university
network, while placing emphasis on information
security management processes, such as risk
analysis, architecture review, code inspection,
and security testing.
 Organizational factors were the most critical fac-
tors when compared to the technological and en-
vironmental factors which appear to influence
the effectiveness of information security meas-
ures and, subsequently, data regulation readiness.
 Universities will have to balance the implementa-
tion of tangible solutions to mitigate risks within
the scope of their budget while promoting user
compliance, despite perceived ‘restrictions.’
 For biomedical researchers, questions remain on
the impact of POPIA legislation on data sharing,
open science, and collaborations.
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would encounter these data-relevant policies at the level
of a ‘user’, and the management of personal informa-
tion of research participants is of direct relevance to
biomedical researchers.
The Protection of Personal Information Act (No 4 of
2013) (POPIA) was signed into law on 19 November
2013 and at the time that interviews were conducted in
this study, the implementation date was not yet known.3
Earlier this year, the office of the Information Regulator
(IR) approached the President of SA requesting that 1
April 2020 be the declared date on which the remaining
provisions of POPIA commence. Following this imple-
mentation date, a one-year grace period will be
provided, and organizations would have to be POPIA-
compliant by 31 March 2021.
In accordance with sections 40 and 65 of the POPIA,
the IR is required to assist with development and ap-
proval of codes of conduct.4 These codes of conduct op-
erate as additional requirements for POPIA and as such,
do not limit the right to privacy of a data subject, which
is outlined in the POPIA. The purpose of the code of
conduct is to provide a mechanism for compliance and
accountability, which is tailor-made to various sectors.
However, any code of conduct, which has been devel-
oped, must still be approved by the IR to ensure that
the requirements of Chapter 7 of the Act have been
met.5 In 2018, Universities South Africa, a membership
organization which represents public universities in
South Africa, launched a project to draft a code of con-
duct for public universities. A task team of representa-
tives from public universities in South Africa and an
external expert were constituted and produced the first
draft of the code of conduct which was distributed in
May 2019 to the South African universities for com-
ment. Once the code of conduct is approved by the IR,
it will be legally binding and apply to the processing of
personal information by all ‘public higher education
institutions’ as defined in section 1 of the Higher
Education Act 101 of 1997.6 As we await the outcome of
this national consultative process, it is important to un-
derstand the factors that govern data security and how
it impacts the implementation strategies of any national
policy framework.
While South African universities are coming to terms
with the need to establish effective governance of infor-
mation security due to the external forces on the
institutional environment from data regulatory agen-
cies, understanding the placement of security in an aca-
demic context remains problematic. Therefore, there
exists an urgent need for improvement in the way data
and information are collected, stored, and disseminated
within university systems, and with greater reference to
sensitive information and data. Security measures and
policies must be in place to guarantee the integrity, con-
fidentiality, and availability of information. To achieve
this, technological, organizational, and environmental
factors must be investigated without undervaluing any
factor. Therefore, the research has used the Technology,
Organisation and Environment (TOE) framework to in-
vestigate and analyse factors influencing the effective-
ness of information security policies and compliance in
the participating universities.
In order to assess whether SA universities had proper
and reliable information security measures, practices,
policies, and management in place, a TOE framework
was applied to three SA universities. The analysis
allowed for the identification of existing gaps within the
university IT domain to provide a point of departure
for further research, to develop comprehensive policies
for information security at tertiary institutions, in line
with POPIA compliance.
POPIA as a legal data protection
framework
The POPIA is the South African data protection law,
promulgated on 26 November 2013, with the aim of
protecting identifiable personal information of natural
persons, and juristic persons from malicious intent in
accordance with privacy rights determined by section 14
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act
No 108 of 1996).7 The POPIA rests upon the establish-
ment of a set of data protection standards to specify the
satisfactory collection, handling, and utilization of
data.8 The South African POPIA covers aspects that
incorporates: legal or lawful processing of the personal
information traversing South Africa, accountability,
processing limitation, purpose specification, retention
and restriction of records, information quality, security
safeguards, data subject participation, transfer of per-
sonal information across national boundaries, and
codes of conduct.9 Non-compliance with the directives
3 SAICA, ‘Protection of Personal Information Act’ (2016) <https://www.
pwc.co.za/en/services/advisory/popi.html> accessed 16 July 2018.
4 Republic of South Africa, ‘Protection of Personal Information, Act 4 of
2013’ (Government Gazette 1 2013) <https://www.gov.za/documents/
protection-personal-information-act> accessed 5 May 2020.
5 ibid.
6 Republic of South Africa, Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 [1997].
7 John Hatchard, ‘The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa’
[1994] 38 Journal of African Law 70.
8 J. Eric Davies, ‘Studies in Technical and Social Influences on Information
and Library Management’ <https://hdl.handle.net/2134/32811> accessed
27 February 2020.
9 SAICA (n 3).
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of POPIA may result in the IR imposing fines of up to
ZAR10 million, depending on circumstances.10
POPIA is derived from a version of the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union
(EU) and both regulations address the protection of
personal information of residents from unauthorized
access; however, there are differences between them.11
The GDPR has gone through several versions of review
and modification, expanding applicability to real-world
problems. POPIA derived some concepts of earlier itera-
tions of the GDPR and as such, POPIA compliance does
not necessarily indicate GDPR compliance. In practical
terms, and considering that Europe is South Africa’s
predominant trade partner, GDPR non-compliance
could have a negative impact on scholarly and global re-
search partnerships and coupled with the possibility of
fines (the upper limit of which is 20 million euro, or 4
per cent of global turnover) the financial implications of
non-compliance would be disastrous for South African
Universities.12
TOE framework analysis
Recent research has recognized that technological fac-
tors are not the only key to effective information secu-
rity controls; there is also a need to understand the
impact of human and organizational factors.13 A better
understanding of how different factors such as techno-
logical, organizational, and environmental factors influ-
ence the implementation and effectiveness of
information security policies and compliance is essen-
tial, as this may elucidate how different factors could
lead to potential sources of security breaches and vul-
nerabilities within organizations.14 A TOE IT/IS adop-
tion framework that was developed by Tornatsky &
Fleischer based on assumption that IT/IS adoption in
organizations is influenced by three elements—technol-
ogy, organization, and environment— was used in a
small comparative case study based on findings from
interviews with ICT professionals from three SA
universities.15
Study methodology
The TOE framework is a recognized adoption frame-
work in the information systems field with several
researchers having employed this framework in studies.
For this qualitative research study, a questionnaire was
designed using concepts of the TOE framework as a ba-
sis to guide semi-structured interviews. The purposeful
sampling design used for this study in order to select
participants in accordance with the research objec-
tives.16 Purposeful sampling ensures that the study pop-
ulation delivers adequate information needed for the
study, and research by Baskarada surmised that with
purposeful sampling, three individual participants
would be sufficient to provide reliable, adequate, and
valuable data that are appropriate for a study, thereby
negating a reliance on a large sample set.17 While the
current study involved one respondent from each uni-
versity who participated in the semi-structured inter-
views, the participants have a high level of expertise and
are involved in all day-to-day functional activities
within the IT/IS domains at the universities.
Only consenting participants were interviewed.
Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed by
two individuals in the research team to ensure accuracy.
The transcribed interviews produced over 29,000 words
of text, responses were grouped and coded, and themes
were formulized to facilitate a rich data set for analysis.
Interview text was analysed with ATLAS.ti and the
10 Republic of South Africa (n 4).
11 EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Regulation (EU) 2016/
679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of per-
sonal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (2016) OJ
L119/1.
12 Nkholedzeni Sidney Netshakhuma, ‘Assessment of a South Africa
National Consultative Workshop on the Protection of Personal
Information Act (POPIA)’ [2019] Global Knowledge, Memory and
Communication.
13 Rayford B Vaughn Jr, Ronda Henning, Kevin Foxb, ‘An Empirical Study
of Industrial Security-Engineering Practices’ [2002] 61 Journal of
Systems and Software 225; David Botta and others, ‘Towards
Understanding IT Security Professionals and Their Tools’ [2007]
Proceedings of the 3rd Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security 100–11.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1280680.1280693; Konstantin Beznosov and Olga
Beznosova, ‘On the Imbalance of the Security Problem Space and Its
Expected Consequences’ [2007] 15 Information Management and
Computer Security 420.
14 Liene Kreicberga, ‘Internal Threat to Information Security -
Countermeasures and Human Factor within SME’ (2010) <http://www.
diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid¼diva2:1019129> accessed 21 June
2018.
15 Edward WN Bernoider and Patrick Schmöllerl, ‘A Technological,
Organisational, and Environmental Analysis of Decision Making
Methodologies and Satisfaction in the Context of IT Induced Business
Transformations’ [2013] 224 European Journal of Operational Research
141; Luis F Luna-Reyes and J. Ramon Gil-Garcia, ‘Understanding the
Co-Evolution of Institutions, Technology, and Organizations: The
Enactment of the State Government Portal of Puebla’ [2013] The
Proceedings of the 14th Annual Conference on Digital Government
Research, 214; Hsin-Pin Fu and Hsiang-Ting Su, ‘A Framework for a
Technology-Organization-Environment Implementation Model in
Taiwan’s Traditional Retail Supermarkets’ [2014] 6(3) International
Journal of Organizational 121–29; Osden Jokonya, ‘A Framework to
Assist Organisations with Information Technology Adoption
Governance’ (Thesis, 2014) <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/749f/
7a0fbeda39e5277a7182bf52b6dad08bb663.pdf> accessed 21 June 2019
16 Sasa Baskarada, ‘Qualitative Case Study Guidelines’ (2014) 19 The
Qualitative Report 1; Robert K Yin, ‘Validity and Generalization in
Future Case Study Evaluations’ [2013] 19 SAGE Journals 321.
17 John H Maindonald, Qualitative Research from Start to Finish by Robert
K. Yin (Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2011); see also Baskarada, ibid.
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graphical representation of data was performed using
the Freeplane application.18 To maintain agreed confi-
dentiality with the participant institutions, the three
universities were labelled A–C.
Below, the issues which occurred in common at the
three participating universities are presented (Figure 1).
Technology factors
The major concern highlighted by two of the three par-
ticipants under technological factors relates to poor se-
curity infrastructure at their institution. The focus of
security infrastructure relates to the ability to best use
new or existing technological solutions to monitor secu-
rity processes such as authorization mechanisms, system
patching, firewalls, and anti-virus software. At the time
of the interviews, participants indicated that both the
application and network patches were not in good
standing. Some of the factors identified by the respond-
ents which contributed to this included: network
patches not being updated as they ought to be, authenti-
cation challenges, complexity of the systems, poor data
management, lack of classification mechanism, lack of
adequate budget to acquire needed tools, staff, and
mechanisms to perform routine maintenance. With
regards to data classification, the authors suggest that
the first practical solution required is the development
of a universally applied data classification scheme with
special personal information having a separate and de-
fined classification. All data types cannot be given the
same level of data encryption, due to the cost and risk
(a successful breach attempt on one database exposes
the encryption key of other databases). Applying the
same encryption to biomedical data and other sensitive
data such as study participant metadata, as is applied to
financial records, for example, is not acceptable
practice.
The results from the study highlighted the value of
maintaining the security infrastructure as it facilitates
the management of security within the university net-
work. Tools such as firewalls, encryption mechanisms,
authentication mechanisms, and non-repudiation
mechanisms are essential for a university system.
Security measures must be taken to ensure that data
quality and integrity and these measures must be con-
tinuously checked for consistency and proper function-
ality. In order to achieve this, the authors highlight the
need to place increased emphasis on the information se-
curity management processes such as risk analysis, ar-
chitecture review, code inspection, and security testing.
In addition, the above processes need to be monitored
on a regular basis, as malfunction of these tools can lead
to failure of effective security management and drive up
costs associated with Information Technology, which
Figure 1: Graphic illustration of a common identified trait from responses of the respondents (all the participated universities)
18 Atlas.ti , ‘Qualitative Data Analysis & Research Software’ (2015)
<https://atlasti.com/qualitative-analysis-data/> accessed 7 June 2019; see
also Freeplane, ‘Freeplane/Freeplane’ (2018) <https://github.com/free
plane/freeplane> accessed 7 June 2019.
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will negatively influence compliance to information se-
curity practices.
Digital transformation in the university environment
has seen a shift in Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) to
Bring Your Own Everything (BYOE).19 All respondents
in the study eluded to BYOD policy on IT capacity and
security with one respondent speaking to the fact that,
on average, a student may own between three to four
internet-enabled devices, each of which can be con-
nected to the university network at any time. It is pre-
dicted that the number of connected devices on campus
networks will continue to increase each year, as smart-
phones, laptops, tablets, and wearable devices become
ubiquitous in daily life.20 BYOD policy not only bur-
dens IT teams in the areas of authentication, explosive
bandwidth consumption, access control, and university
server security, but also in terms of protection of infor-
mation. In addition, interviewees made mention of IT
risk associated with mobile computational devices.
Users often switch between devices for work purposes
and commonly make use of hardware elements, such as
external drives, to transfer data, including sensitive data.
Users frequently travel externally with these devices, in-
creasing information security risk through physical theft
and data corruption when connected to untrusted net-
works. There is, therefore, a need to provide tangible
solutions to mitigate this externally driven risk, and this
may involve imposing a level of control on users—
which would undoubtedly be perceived by users as ‘too
restrictive’.
From responses in the interviews, it was noted that
formalized data management policy and strategy was
lacking, and this had negative implications not only on
internal compliance but also on legislative compliance.
It is the authors’ strong suggestion that for successful
data security implementation and maintenance, man-
agement structures should equip the IT teams with the
necessary tools and mechanisms to overcome the chal-
lenges faced on a daily basis. This can, however, only be
achieved if management starts to perceive security and
privacy issues as a universal problem and understands
the true (though mostly indirect) benefits of prioritizing
information security. As such, the addition of security
and related IT issues to the institutions’ core function
and mandates will enable IT teams to deliver the needed
technical support and insight, aligned with mission and
vision of the university and leading to a successful digi-
tal transformation journey.
Organization factors
Organizational factors define the influential factors that
contribute to the success or failure of information secu-
rity according to the users. Findings from the analysis of
interview responses in the current study showed that or-
ganizational factors were the most critical, when com-
pared to the technological and environmental contexts
examined. Some of the major issues highlighted by
respondents within the organizational context include:
lack of top management support, funding, or financial
constraints; lack of effective awareness training, infor-
mation security practices not being part of the manage-
ment core priority functions; lack of coordinated
functions among units and departments; long approval
times for IT policies by the councils, decentralization of
systems, staff behaviour, and perception towards infor-
mation security processes; lack of competent staff as a
result of limited resources, IT directors and managers
not being a part of university decision-making bodies;
and difficulties in quantifying return of investment for
information security spending.
Respondents additionally spoke to the substantial
contribution and impact of human error to the infor-
mation vulnerabilities or threats, which occurred in
organizations. These human error events may be due to
negligence or a lack of awareness. Vulnerabilities or
breaches occur not because security is difficult, but
rather because people think security is not difficult. A
lack of knowledge on information security has also been
identified as the greatest threat to information security
in other studies and human behaviour was again identi-
fied in the current study.21 The authors recommend
that universities should implement consistent user
awareness training which should address issues such as
recognizing phishing scams, email hygiene, password
hygiene, Internet usage best practices, security practices
(eg locking of PCs or laptops when unused), and drive
awareness of existing information security legislation. In
addition, security should not be perceived as simply an
IT problem but rather as a social problem. If this can be
achieved, then the decision makers will possess the
knowledge to add information security to their core
functions as an issue, which must be addressed.
19 Joanna Lyn Grama and Kim Milford, ‘Ahead of the Curve: IoT Security,
Privacy, and Policy in Higher Ed’ in Women Securing the Future with
TIPPSS for IoT [2019] <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-
15705-0_5> accessed 25 May 2019.
20 SevOne, ‘5 Top IT Challenges in High Education SevOne’ [2018]
<https://www.sevone.com/white-paper/5-top-it-challenges-high-educa
tion> accessed 25 May 2019.
21 ME Thomson and Rossouw Von Solms, ‘Information Security
Awareness: Educating Your Users Effectively’ [1998] 6 Information
Management and Computer Security 167; Johan F Van Niekerk and
Rossouw Von Solms, ‘Information Security Culture: A Management
Perspective’ [2010] 29 Computers and Security 476.
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Interestingly, one of the participants had identified ad-
ditional challenges with regards to human behaviour.
The IT team at this facility has been less pre-occupied
with substantial financial constraints, thereby allowing
them to gain insight into other risks to policy imple-
mentation and compliance. The authors observe that if
the financial issues at the other two universities were re-
solved, there is a high possibility that they would experi-
ence similar problems brought about by human
behaviour. This presents a unique opportunity for the
universities to discuss shared experiences and for those
who are less well resourced to learn from advancements
and knowledge gained by well-resourced facilities.
Solutions to information security challenges could be
developed by collaborative efforts at these facilities,
where teams gain insight from each other and collec-
tively identify future risks which may not currently
exist.
Lastly, the authors recognize the need for security
professionals to present security issues to the manage-
ment in a language they will understand (in form of
business-oriented metrics and not in technical, opera-
tional metrics). To this end, it may be beneficial for
non-IT managers and executives to participate in basic
IT courses in order to better understand the technical
jargon used in the information security sphere. In infor-
mation security, communication is key, and effective
communication of the implications of poor IT strategies
would be a motivation for high-level structures to en-
sure that this area is prioritized.
Environmental factors
Environmental factors measure how pressures of inter-
national and national standards and government regula-
tions impact security implementation, and examine the
audit, security policies, and standards imposed to man-
age information security in a proper and acceptable
way.
With regards to POPIA, information management is
not outlined in the Act itself but must be implemented
for compliance. At the time of the interviews, there was
still no certainty on the date of implementation of
POPIA and it appeared that there was no external pres-
sure from government. Participants in the study made
mention to how the early stage of adoption and a lack
of policy context had resulted in a lack of understanding
of how to frame POPIA inception. Furthermore,
respondents highlighted that no incentive or motivation
from the government existed to encourage its adoption,
leaving organizations at a loss as to how to fund the
interventions required for compliance. The authors reit-
erate that the cost of compliance will differ greatly from
one institution to another and have identified this fi-
nancial burden as a key issue that is already preventing
the implementation of basic information security meas-
ures and may result in low prioritization of POPIA
compliance.
Responses from participants demonstrate a general
lack of practical regulatory guidance and training from
POPIA IR and government, which may lead to poor im-
plementation and unenforceable security controls.
Moreover, since there are inadequate training and
awareness from the law enforcement and judiciary fra-
ternity, respondents felt that fining of this regulation
would be near impossible. We conclude that POPIA
might not be taken seriously until such time that non-
compliance is ‘punished’ and that on the part of the IR,
more effort needs to be focused on engagement with all
stakeholders. The authors believe that this engagement
would be mutually beneficial in that universities would
be able to obtain greater clarity on requirements for
compliance, and raise practical concerns related to the
current format of the legislation and drafted codes of
conduct. In this study, it was noted that participants
appeared to be more familiarized with the GDPR than
with POPIA, which may be due to the intense public ex-
posure to the European legislation. It is the opinion of
the authors that harnessing a multitude of platforms to
increase awareness of the POPIA regulation may serve
to highlight the need to enhance security measures by
individuals, universities, and organizations in South
Africa.
Interviewed participants highlighted that an organi-
zation’s compliance to GDPR would make compliance
to POPIA easier but not vice versa. This is a challenge to
organizations in South Africa, considering the perceived
need to comply with both regulations. At this point,
institutes that have or intend to include distance learn-
ing programmes as part of the educational offering may
prioritize one framework over another. One participant
suggested that the South African government needs to
take a similar approach to these regulations as Japan
has, with the EU. These two entities settled on a cooper-
ative agreement that allows the Japan policy privacy leg-
islation to be recognized as equivalent to the GDPR.22 If
22 European Union, ‘Official Journal of the European Union L 107’ [2015]
22 (ISSN 1977-0677) Publications Office of the European Union
<https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/903df42b-
eb14-11e4-892c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en> accessed 17 October 2019;
C Wigand and S Soumullion , ‘Joint Statement by Haruhi Kumazawa,
Commissioner of the Personal Information Protection Commission of
Japan and Vera Jourová, Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and
Gender Equality of the European Commission’ (Statement, 2018)
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_
18_4548> accessed 7 June 2019; Ulrich Kirchhoff and Tobias Schiebe,
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a similar concession can be proposed for POPIA, the
operational effort required for compliance would be de-
creased and the adoption rate among universities and
other organizations could increase. In conclusion, the
authors identify that the first step which must be under-
taken by university IT/IS departments to comply with
the requirements of POPIA is to communicate the busi-
ness value of information to all stakeholders.
Understanding this may result in all users becoming
more aware of sensitivities, risks, and responsibilities
when handling, storing, processing, and distributing
data during their day-to-day activities. In addition, this
would also demonstrate the value of prioritizing infor-
mation security and data management compliance to
decision-making executives of the university, thereby
changing the perception that funding in this sector is
simply a ‘grudge spend’.
Concluding remarks
Recent research has recognized that technological fac-
tors are not the only key to effective information secu-
rity controls, there exists an additional need to evaluate
the impact of human and organizational factors.23
Universities are becoming more dependent on their net-
works and information infrastructure than ever before
and as this dependence grows, so too, does the strategic
importance of their IT teams. Information security is
not solely a technical issue and technical controls can
only be effective if end users adhere to policy control.
Organizations cannot protect the integrity, confidential-
ity, and availability of information in today’s highly net-
worked systems environment without ensuring that
each person involved understands his/her roles and re-
sponsibilities and is adequately trained to perform
them.24 It is of paramount importance for university
management and IT departments to collaborate effi-
ciently and effectively to provide solutions that not only
solve current needs but also future proof the institutions
as the technology age continues its rapid evolution. In
accordance with data security policy, universities must
safeguard personal information from data breaches, us-
ing both technological and organizational measures.
POPIA compliance will require that universities develop
and implement policies and procedures, clearly define
roles and responsibilities, and introduce focused train-
ing while considering the information security and
management standards. A better understanding of how
different factors such as technological, organizational,
and environmental factors influence the implementa-
tion and effectiveness of information security policies
and compliance at tertiary education institutions is in-
valuable, as it sheds light on the current, and real-world,
challenges being faced by these facilities. The effort re-
quired to identify and implement practical solutions for
basic data collections can be exponentially amplified
when dealing with biomedical data collections. Without
first identifying and addressing how these critical issues
impact the entirety of the data collection, institutions of
higher learning are left with minimal resources to navi-
gate complexities associated with the POPIA regulation.
Finally, the authors suggest that future studies con-
ducted in this area should include evidence-based re-
search on the impact of POPIA with regards to the use
of biomedical data in universities. These studies should
be undertaken in order to properly measure POPIA’s
impact, adequacy, and operation in practice.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipaa007
Advance Access Publication 27 May 2020
‘The Reform of the Japanese Act on Protection of Personal Information
From the Practitioner’s Perspective’ [2017] 22(44) Journal of Japanese
Law <https://www.zjapanr.de/index.php/zjapanr/article/view/1178>
accessed 25 may 2019.
23 Vaughn, Henning, Foxb (n 13); David Botta and others, ‘Towards
Understanding IT Security Professionals and Their Tools’ [2007]
Proceedings of the 3rd Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security 100–11.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1280680.1280693.
24 Johan van Niekerk and Rossouw von Solms, ‘A Holistic Framework for
the Fostering of an Information Security Sub-culture in Organizations’
[Information Security South Africa Conference (ISSA), 2005] Pretoria,
South Africa.
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